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Abstract  
Insurance is pervasive in many social settings. As a cooperative device based on risk pooling, 
it serves to attenuate the adverse consequences of various risks (health, unemployment, 
natural catastrophes, and so forth) by offering policyholders coverage against the losses 
implied by adverse events in exchange for the payment of premiums. In the insurance 
industry, the concept of actuarial fairness serves to establish what could be adequate, fair 
premiums. Accordingly, premiums paid by policyholders should match as closely as possible 
their risk exposure (i.e. their expected losses). Such premiums are the product of the 
probabilities of losses and the expected losses. This article presents a discussion of the 
fairness of actuarial fairness through three steps: (1) defining the concept based on its 
formulation within the insurance industry; (2) determining in which sense it may be about 
fairness; and (3) raising some objections to the actual fairness of actuarial fairness. The 
necessity of a normative evaluation of actuarial fairness is justified by the influence of the 
concept on the current reforms of public insurance systems and the fact that it highlights the 
question of the repartition of the gains and burdens of social cooperation. 
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Insurance is an important mechanism of cooperation for modern industrialized societies. The 
principle is that individuals gather resources against risk. By doing so, they are said to “pool” 
their risks. Therefore, insurance is usually characterized as a risk-pooling device. 
Fundamentally, insurance is a cooperative mechanism that transforms the significance and 
implications of random events by mutualizing risks and their adverse consequences.1  
From an individual point of view, risks imply uncertainty. For instance, what is your 
chance (not the average probability of the population you belong to) of being run over by a 
car? Of being afflicted by cancer? Of becoming unemployed or outliving your personal 
savings? These questions cannot be answered at a strictly individual level. Individuals 
experience uncertainty regarding accidents of various sorts: disease, chronic pathology, 
economic downturn, death, and so forth. From a collective point of view, though, uncertainty 
can be converted into probabilities. In the case of car accidents, for instance, instead of pure 
uncertainty, I may know that I have 1:100 odds of getting involved in an accident and, 
perhaps, 1:1000 odds of dying. Risk pooling provides the opportunity to calculate the 
probabilities of a particular set of events. In return, the expected costs for such risks can be 
calculated and spread over the policyholders through premiums. 
In that sense, insurance is about transforming uncertain adverse events with uncertain 
outcomes into statistical events with certain outcomes: the expected losses that the payment of 
the premiums reflects. Following Knightian terminology (Knight 1921), insurance transforms 
uncertainty into risk, which is beneficial for individuals since the future becomes reliable. 
However, insurance can only deliver its benefits (the reduction/suppression of uncertainty, the 
spread of the costs for risks over the insured population) under an assumption of actuarial 
accuracy, i.e. if the probabilities and losses attached to adverse events are precisely 
calculated. 
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Stemming from this actuarial accuracy, a further, but different, argument common in 
the insurance industry stipulates that individuals ought to be charged premiums reflecting 
their risk profile for two reasons. On the one hand, if the structure of individual premiums 
does not reflect the variation in risk exposure among policyholders, the financial stability of 
insurance will be undermined due to the multiplication of opportunistic behaviours, namely 
moral hazard (some insureds will take more risks as a result of being cheaply covered) and 
adverse selection (the insurance will attract high (“good”) risks and drive away low (“bad” 
risks as a result of premiums that are not in line with individuals’ risk exposure). On the other 
hand, non-actuarial premiums lead to a distribution of the burden of risk coverage that is 
unfair because it does not reflect individual risk profiles. This is the common justification for 
actuarial fairness offered by the industry: individuals should pay premiums that reflect the 
risks they bring to the insurance pool. 
As a concept appealing to a conception of fairness, actuarial fairness naturally attracts 
the political philosopher. The fact that the insurance industry defines a particular way of 
calculating individual contribution to a cooperative mechanism as ‘fair’ raises three questions. 
(1) How to characterize actuarial fairness? The first section of the article tackles this 
question by collecting the sparse material on actuarial fairness present in the literature, mostly 
issued by the industry, to draw a rough image of the content of the concept of actuarial 
fairness.  
(2) What is the fairness of actuarial fairness? The second section offers a critical 
discussion of the concept of actuarial fairness as defined and used by the industry. Several 
reasons why non-actuarial premiums might be unfair are evaluated, such as cost shifting and 
deception. It is then shown that the ‘non alteration of expected utility’ (or ‘expected utility 
invariance’) is the principle that closely captures the reason why non-actuarial premiums 
might be unfair. Finally, it is argued that individual responsibility, which is a central argument 
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invoked by the insurance industry to justify actuarial fairness, is actually more a side-
argument than a core component of actuarial fairness.  
(3) Is actuarial fairness actually fair? Based on the precedent developments, the last 
section challenges three claims that are central to the concept of actuarial fairness. 
(3.a) Individuals should pay for their own risks and only their own risks. 
(3.b) When entering into a pooling device such as insurance, individuals expect to 
contribute only at the level of their own risks. And the corollary: if they don’t, 
premiums are unfair. 
(3.c) The fairness of the principle of expected utility invariance. 
As a conclusion, we advance the idea that the discussion of the fairness of actuarial fairness 
unveils a more profound issue, common in the contractarian literature: how to distribute the 
costs and gains produced by a specific cooperative mechanism. 
Finally, this article has two far-reaching ambitions: one political, another 
philosophical. The political ambition is to stimulate discussions, especially in regard to public 
policies, on the justifications for insurance practices either public or private. Because 
questions of the right contribution of policyholders and citizens to diverse insurance 
mechanisms are becoming central (e.g. for public pensions, national health insurance), it 
seems important to have a serious discussion about the very concept of actuarial fairness, 
which has a great influence on the debates that surround public insurance.2 
The philosophical ambition is contained in the assumptions that such a discussion 
unveils. The concept of actuarial fairness raises probably one of the most fascinating issues in 
regard to social cooperation: what is the right scope for redistributing the gains and burdens 
of social cooperation?3 Should the distribution of gains and burdens be restricted to the 
participants of a given cooperative mechanism? Or should such a distribution be mitigated by 
other considerations? The issue that actuarial fairness unveils is an issue about moral 
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entitlements concerning the social product of individuals cooperating with each other and, 
also, about the proper balance between efficiency and equity. In that direction, this article 
concludes by mentioning avenues of future research. 
 
1. Actuarial Fairness: The View from the Industry 
Actuarial fairness is the guiding principle of the insurance industry. It constitutes the core 
justification for underwriting practices (i.e. risk classification)4 and legitimates the freedom 
(or right) to underwrite, which is the right of insurers to screen applicants, on criteria they find 
relevant, to determine their risk profile and either charge them premiums that track these 
criteria or refuse to insure them. The fundamental idea is that “fairness means equal treatment 
for equal risks” (Leigh 1998, p. 33) or, in other words: 
“An insurance rate structure will be considered to be unfairly discriminatory...if, allowing 
for practical limitations, there are premium differences that do not correspond to expected 
losses and average expenses or if there are expected average cost differences that are not 
reflected in premium differences.” (Williams quoted by Hoy and Ruse (2005, p. 229)) 
Premiums should be calculated on the expected losses (the product of the probabilities of 
adverse results and their expected amplitude). From an insurer’s view, actuarial fairness 
implies that “we are morally obliged to make sure that premiums for insurance of any type 
reflect the risks of the insured” (Daniels 2004, p. 124, emphasis added). This is interesting 
because actuarial fairness is presented as an obligation that goes beyond efficiency (to 
equilibrate the assets and liabilities) and extends to morality. Then, underwriting becomes the 
vehicle for achieving fairness. 
“In insurance underwriting [unfair discrimination] occurs when equal risks are treated 
differently. In other words, it occurs when no sound actuarial justification or reasonably 
anticipated claims experience can justify the manner in which risks are classified’, or 
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when an underwriter misclassifies a risk because a relevant piece of information is kept 
from consideration.” (Meyer 2004, p. 31) 
The purpose of underwriting is to classify risks. “Risk classification based on medical 
underwriting lies at the core of the existing voluntary, private life insurance business” (Meyer 
2004, p. 27). Risks are not assessed on a strictly individual basis though. Instead, individuals 
are sorted into risk categories (class rating) according to diverse criteria (demographics, 
personal history, genetics, and so on) and charged premiums that reflect the average risk 
profile of their class. 
Actuarial fairness stipulates that individuals should assume, through adjusted 
premiums, the costs of the risk that they “import” to the insurance pool. A simple example 
makes this idea compelling. Imagine that ten merchants who operate vessels for trading 
overseas decide to pool their resources for facing losses. The value of each individual 
shipment is €1,000 and, a priori, the probability of losing a shipment is .10. So, the fair 
premium to impose on policyholders is €100. Now, imagine that five merchants have bought 
defective vessels that have twice the chance of wreckage. If premiums remain the same, it 
will be impossible to indemnify all the unlucky merchants, without undermining the solvency 
of insurance, since the collected resources will be insufficient to cover the losses. Actuarial 
considerations are then used to recalculate the premiums. 
However, the actuarial adjustment may be implemented in different manners with a 
disparate impact on the policyholders. For instance,  the premiums paid by all policyholders 
might be increased by €50. The new premiums (€150) are actuarially sound in the sense that 
they account for the general increase in risk exposure for the whole population. But they are 
also actuarially unsound because they do not account for the structure of risk profiles present 
in the pool, i.e. the distribution of risks among individuals. More importantly, they are 
actuarially unfair: merchants who operate non-defective vessels pay premiums not related to 
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their risk profile. Therefore, they de facto subsidize merchants who own defective vessels. 
Another possibility is to maintain the same premiums for the former (€100), but to double the 
amount paid by the latter (€200). Precise underwriting is indispensable for adequately 
discriminating individuals according to their risk exposure, re-assessing probabilities and 
losses, and calculating new fair premiums. This is the only actuarially fair solution since 
everyone is paying for premiums that reflect their risk profile. 
Therefore, actuarial fairness requires proper risk evaluation and risk classification. 
When such requirements are not met, i.e. when underwriting is not or cannot be accurately 
done, resources are transferred from the low risks to the high risks. In other words, the 
mechanism of insurance changes policyholders’ expected value5. In this sense, insurance is 
actuarially unfair because the expected utility of the low-risk individuals is reduced while the 
expected utility of the high-risk individuals is increased. However, and here is the point, it 
remains to be proven that “something” is unfair about non-actuarial premiums. 
Fairness is a central concept of insurance theory and practice, especially when it 
comes to underwriting: “the process of risk classification serves insurers, policy holders, and 
applicants for coverage (or proposed insureds) by perpetuating financial soundness and 
fairness” (Meyer 2004, p. 29, emphasis added). Fairness directly relates to the moral ideal of 
insurance as seen by the industry. According to this view, “risk classification ensures that all 
of an insurer’s applicants and existing policyholders are treated fairly” (Meyer 2004, p. 31, 
emphasis added). “To avoid unfair discrimination and to treat all applicants and all existing 
policy holders fairly, insurance companies must set premiums at a level consistent with the 
risk represented by each proposed insured” (Meyer 2004, p. 31, emphasis added). So, the 
question remains: why are non-actuarial premiums unfair? 
 
2. Actuarial Fairness: Formulating Unfairness 
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At first sight, the reason why non-actuarial premiums may be unfair seems to have something 
to do with cost shifting. Since it is unfair for some individuals to bear costs stemming from 
the actions of others, non-actuarial premiums are unfair. But in this section, we demonstrate 
that not all instances of cost shifting may be objectionable. For insurance, the alteration of the 
expected utility is morally problematic because it is unfair. We then discuss the reasons why 
such alteration is unfair. This section closes with a discussion of the issue of individual 
responsibility, which is regularly invoked to justify the strict application of actuarial 
principles to the calculation of policyholders’ contributions to the insurance pool. We 
demonstrate that individual responsibility is a side-argument that has little to do with actuarial 
fairness and, consequently, cannot be used to explain on normative grounds why non-actuarial 
premiums are unfair. 
 
2.a Cost shifting 
Individuals should pay for their own losses and only their own losses. Therefore, any cost 
shifting from one policyholder to another is unfair.6 In the case of non-actuarial premiums, 
some policyholders pay for the costs incurred by those whose risks have been under-
evaluated. The latter “externalize” their costs onto the former (Heath 2007).7 As a factory that 
dumps toxic products in a river imposes negative externalities, i.e. costs, on riverside 
inhabitants, non-actuarial premiums allow high risks to transfer part of their costs to low risks. 
In short, when high risks join an insurance that does not abide by strict actuarial principles, 
they create an externality for low risks, which is materially prejudicial and morally 
objectionable for the latter. 
The argument may be understood in two manners. A radical version is to judge that 
any cost shifting among individuals involved in a cooperative mechanism is unfair. A milder 
Insert 
Table 1 
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version is to advance that only certain forms of cost shifting are unfair, the central point being 
about the conditions of the (un-)fairness of cost shifting. 
(1) Interpreted as a critique of cost shifting in general, the argument is too radical. 
Many cooperative arrangements are precisely built on cost shifting without being unfair to 
any party in the exchange, like Credit Default Swaps (CDS)8. In risk-shifting arrangements, 
an agent A promises to assume a loss that could occur to an agent B in exchange for a fixed or 
recurring payment.9 In the case of a CDS, more than shifting his costs to A, B swaps a 
potential loss (the structure of the expected losses he faces) for a determined one (the 
compensation paid to A). For his part, A receives a determined payment in exchange for an 
expected loss. 
The shift of the expected losses from B to A is not unfair because A agrees to such a 
transfer beforehand and receives a payment for it. If A had not agreed to the cost shifting, it 
would have been unfair for him to bear the risk-induced losses. It is precisely the reason why 
negative externalities are unfair: a third party (the agent who bears the cost of the externality), 
who was not a part of the original exchange that produces the externality, never consented to 
the shift of costs. When a factory spills toxic chemicals in a river as a result of the production 
process, the costs incurred by riverside inhabitants are externalities, and they are usually 
presumed to call for redress or compensation. The unfairness of externalities does not stem 
from cost shifting per se, but from the fact that the cost was imposed on someone without his 
consent and/or without him benefiting from it. Imagine that the factory negotiates a monetary 
compensation beforehand with inhabitants for the right to pollute; costs will still be shifted, 
but in virtue of an agreement and a compensation.10 It is difficult to see anything inherently 
objectionable in this arrangement.  
This version of the cost-shifting argument is also too radical regarding its consequence 
for the very principle of insurance as a risk-pooling device. It should lead to the conclusion 
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that the principle of insurance is unfair since insurance is precisely about that: ex post shifting 
of losses from the lucky (low-risk individuals) to the unlucky (high-risk individuals). Thus, 
objection to losses shifting per se does not only constitute the basis of the judgment of the 
unfairness of non-actuarial premiums; it actually provides an argument against the principle 
of insurance in general. Furthermore, it would justify opposition to any freely negotiated 
arrangement according to which some agents face the material responsibility of others, such 
as CDS contracts. 
In response to this objection, one may emphasize that insurance qua cooperative 
mechanism is not a risk-shifting but a risk-pooling mechanism. The difference would be that 
risk-shifting mechanisms lead to the transfer of the material responsibility from one agent to 
another, while, in risk-pooling mechanisms, all agents collectively remain responsible for the 
losses. (This collective responsibility is at the core of private entities like insurance 
companies, fraternal societies, unions, etc., and public institutions such as the state and other 
agencies and local bodies.) Therefore, it would still be legitimate to consider that a given 
insurance arrangement is fair if it does not lead to cost shifting. 
This response underlines that the common confusion between risk shifting and risk 
pooling11 obscures the fact that, in risk-pooling mechanisms, policyholders do not assume the 
costs incurred by other policyholders. In fact, as the rest of the article discusses, they only 
bear a specific kind of costs: the expected losses. As a matter of consequence, it still makes 
sense to consider that a certain kind of cost shifting within a risk-pooling device is unfair and 
should be prevented. In an insurance properly conceived, individuals still pay for their 
expected losses (that are not shifted) even if the mechanism in practice consists, at a given 
time, of drawing resources from the pool, i.e. from the lucky policyholders, to compensate the 
unlucky ones. But, in the long run, all policyholders are supposed to pay only for their own 
costs. 
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Transfers that take place in an insurance that is supported by fair premiums might look 
like cost shifting only in the short run. In the long run, however, policyholders pay for their 
costs and only for their costs: they pay for their expected losses. The unfairness of non-
actuarial premiums is that costs are shifted in both the short and long run, which alters the 
expected losses of policyholders. What is objectionable is not the snapshot where current 
losses are spread over all policyholders, but the more distant picture where some 
policyholders gain at the expense of others. This is the basis of the softer version of the 
shifting-cost argument, which objects to situations where individual expected utilities12 are 
changed by insurance, some gaining what others are losing. 
(2) The moderate version of the cost-shifting argument sees an issue of fairness only 
in certain forms of cost shifting. Additional conditions need to be met to turn loss shifting into 
unfair loss shifting. The infringement of prior entitlement or an initial agreement may be one 
of those. In other words, it is only when loss shifting violates either the very general principle 
under which insurance as a pure risk-pooling mechanism is presumed to operate or the 
intention of agents at the moment they enrolled in such a cooperative device that it might be 
considered to be unfair. Since insurance as risk pooling is presumed to leave every 
policyholder with the same expected utility as when she enrolled, any modification of such 
expected utility indicates that something is potentially unfair. 
To be sure, the unfairness of non-actuarial premiums does not actually lie in the shift 
of ex post (i.e. after the enrolment in the insurance) actual losses but ex ante expected ones. 
Said differently, the problem is not that individuals get compensated when risk occurs. The 
problem is that resources that are unfairly collected finance this compensation. The 
contribution to the insurance pool is unevenly distributed among policyholders. Some pay 
more than their risk exposure, while others pay less. The problem here does not lie in the shift 
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of actual current losses but in the shift of the expected ones.13 Actuarial fairness then implies 
that enrolling in a risk-pooling device should not alter the expected utilities of policyholders. 
 
2.b Alteration of the expected utility 
A modified version of the cost-shifting argument thus stipulates that actuarial fairness consists 
in the non-alteration of individual expected utility. A situation is actuarially fair when each 
policyholder’s expected utility remains unaffected by risk pooling. As insurance mechanisms 
reduce the standard deviation from the expected value (i.e. the “real” average), unfair 
premiums (i.e. premiums which diverge from strict actuarial calculations) generate situations 
where resources are transferred among policyholders. Stated differently, the mere fact of 
joining a risk pool financed by non-actuarial premiums modifies individuals’ prospects of 
losses and gains. In order to avoid this situation, premiums should reflect the expected losses. 
In the merchant example, if a flat rate of €150 is imposed on all agents, the expected 
utility of low-risk merchants is decreased by €50 (when comparing situations without and 
with insurance) when the expected utility of high-risk individuals is increased by €50. There 
is obviously a gain for some agents that is financed by others, outside of the general terms of 
the cooperative mechanism (insurance). Yet, the reason why the modification of the expected 
utility is unfair ought to be identified. Several reasons may be mobilized to prove that there is 
something wrong with the alteration of individuals’ expected utility. However, this 
“something wrong” should be related to fairness. It is insufficient to demonstrate that the 
alteration of policyholders’ expected utility raises a moral issue. It is necessary to prove that it 
raises a problem of fairness. 
(1) A starting point is to cite deception as the reason why non-actuarial premiums are 
unfair: they would be deceptive for the low risks. As the argument goes, individuals enrol to 
be covered against risk. Since unfair premiums do not accurately reflect the distribution of 
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risks among individuals, policyholders de facto participate in a redistributive mechanism 
(some policyholders’ enhanced expected utility is financed by the decreased expected utility 
of other policyholders). Non-actuarial premiums would be unfair because they are deceptive: 
policyholders are misled about the real nature of the cooperative arrangement in which they 
participate. They think that they only pay for themselves when they also pay for risks brought 
to the insurance pool by other, riskier, policyholders. 
On empirical grounds, deception would be facilitated by human epistemic limitations 
highlighted by the research on cognitive biases, heuristics and bounded rationality (Ainslie 
2001; Ariely 2008; Kahneman 2011; Rubinstein 1998; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Simon 
1957; Stanovich 2009). In practice, it is very unlikely that individuals have an accurate (even 
adequate) knowledge of their risk exposure (contrary to the insurance company). The reason 
is that the nature and amount of the information needed is out of reach for a single individual. 
An individual risk profile is statistical data that refers to a given class, which means that it 
makes sense only according to the Law of Large Numbers14, i.e. on a large scale. Being aware 
of one’s risk profile and, more importantly, being able to measure one’s level of risk in 
monetary terms requires actuarial calculation on a large sample, something that is 
unattainable for most individuals. The epistemic context would thus facilitate deception. 
One might, however, agree that non-actuarial premiums are deceptive but still remain 
sceptical that it has anything to do with fairness per se. It may be morally wrong without 
being unfair. Consider the following example. When distributing resources between Paul and 
Jane, an entity called “the great distributor” may promise to Paul that he will get all the 
resources. Afterward, “the great distributor” may change his mind and distribute these 
resources according to the respective needs or merits of Paul and Jane. Paul would have been 
obviously deceived (as would Jane), but “the great distributor’s” final choice may arguably be 
fairer, everything considered. 
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It is then possible to consider that non-actuarial premiums are not unfair from a 
redistributive perspective. An additional condition is needed. In the Jane-Paul example, the 
judgment of fairness (or unfairness) does not depend on the invariability of the initial rules, 
but on the final results. Stated differently, it might convincingly be objected that other 
considerations override the deception of individual expectations. Deception and unfairness 
then are two independent sets of considerations. 
But it might be objected that fairness of outcomes is not the single conception 
available and that another conception will prove non-actuarial premiums unfair. In the guise 
of illustration, an alternative conception is rooted in what could be labelled as “the rules of the 
game” view: a state of affairs is fair if some particular constraints have been respected during 
the process that has generated this state of affairs15. A formulation of this view is provided by 
John Rawls when he writes that “the concept of fairness (…) relates to right dealing between 
persons who are cooperating with or competing against one another, as when one speaks of 
fair games, fair competition, and fair bargains” (Rawls 1958, p. 178). According to Rawls, the 
question of fairness arises in cooperative contexts in regard to the definition of the principles 
regulating the rules of cooperation and the repartition of the gains from cooperation. Fairness 
then bears not only on the outcomes; it also requires that participants freely abide by rules that 
are mutually and equally restrictive of their freedom. 
In Rawlsian language, deception might be interpreted as arising when partners in a 
cooperative mechanism freely decide to follow original rules (the payment of expected losses) 
that, later on, turn out not to be the rules that the insurance plan actually follows (non-
actuarial premiums) and, more, do not mutually and equally restrict the freedom of all 
policyholders (asymmetrical effects on expected utility). It is exactly what the non-actuarial 
premiums capture: premiums that are set at levels that allow some policyholders to extract a 
net benefit from the cooperative mechanism at the expense and without the consent of other 
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policyholders (i.e. not everyone is subject to the same rules regarding the calculation of 
premiums). However, the core idea here is the non-respect of some initial contract among 
partners in cooperation; it is precisely what the idea of deception refers to: a change in the 
original, commonly agreed (at least hypothetically), terms of cooperation. 
(2) Instead of situating the unfairness of the alteration of individuals’ expected utility 
in deception, an alternative is to isolate the unfairness in the breach of the explicit or implicit 
contract between policyholders, i.e. the breach of the terms of cooperation. The unfairness of 
actuarially unsound insurance stems from the violation of what individuals agreed to or what 
it is reasonable to assume they might agree to. This does not rule out the possibility that non-
actuarial premiums might also be deceptive. But, what primarily makes non-actuarial 
premiums unfair is the breach of an (hypothetical) initial agreement. In sum, policyholders 
agreed to be part of a cooperative mechanism, which is transformed into something different 
due to premiums that do not reflect one’s expected losses. Furthermore, by way of 
consequence, non-actuarial premiums are a manner of relaxing the conditions for one side of 
the cooperation (high risks) while raising the bar for the other side (low risks). 
Then, fairness has to be related, in one way or another, to the original expectations of 
the policyholders, i.e. the initial terms of the cooperative mechanism. This assumption is 
compatible with the view, widespread in the industry, that enrolment is a rational choice 
resulting from a cost-benefit calculation based on the initial elements (i.e. the terms of the 
insurance contract) given to the agents: “(…) individuals, when viewing such a voluntary 
transaction, make a personal determination if the cost of redistribution is worth the value of 
the benefit obtained by the insurance” (Lane, p. 143). 
Non-actuarial premiums then lead to an alteration of individuals’ expected utility. 
Policyholders subscribed to insurance in order to have their losses covered in exchange for the 
payment of a premium that should reflect their personal level of risk. Presumably, they did 
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not agree to subsidize other policyholders, a point that is emphasized by the literature on 
insurance: “actuaries traditionally have argued that underwriting is justifiably unequal. This 
defense assumes that all forms of cross-subsidization are inherently wrong” (Moultrie and 
Thomas 1997, p. 129). 
Unfair premiums violate the initial (implicit) agreement that establishes insurance and 
stipulates that no one should benefit from the insurance. Each policyholder should cover his 
risk and only his risk in expected terms. Individuals still gain by pooling their risks because it 
increases predictability in virtue of the Law of Large Numbers. This statistical reliability 
allows the redirection of pooled resources from period to period to those who experience a 
loss. If individuals expect to contribute at the level of their risk profile, but in reality 
contribute less or more than this level, insurance terms are not respected. Low risks then get 
less than what they expected to get, while high risks get more. Again, in addition to the initial 
terms of the contract, it is the very status of policyholders as equal participants in a 
cooperative mechanism who freely agreed to respect rules that are mutually and equally 
restrictive of all participants’ freedom that is violated. 
One way to express this point is to consider insurance as proposing to applicants to 
swap a lottery with various outcomes and probabilities for a certain outcome/loss. Unfair 
premiums pervert this offer by actually exchanging your lottery ticket for a loss that is higher 
than your expected losses if you are a low risk (or lower than your expected losses if you are a 
high risk). The unfairness is due to the transformation of the initial deal into something else. 
This motivates the resistance to community rating within the insurance industry.16 As 
flat premiums are charged to high-risk as well as low-risk individuals, both classes contribute 
equally, but with diverging benefits. The latter receives less than the former for identical 
contributions to the insurance pool. To return to the merchant example, the imposition of flat 
premiums of €150 on all merchants increases the expected utility of the high risks (which 
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moves up from €800 to €850) and, at the same time, reduces the expected utility of the low 
risks (which moves down from €900 to €850). 
The idea that flat rates are unfair echoes the old view that unfairness resides in 
receiving more (or less) than “one’s share”. In Politics (III.9) and Nichomachean Ethics 
(V.3), Aristotle gives a broad definition that has been the blueprint for more refined accounts 
proposed since: fairness is to treat equal people equally and unequal people unequally. In 
other words, fairness implies at some point an idea of equal treatment among individuals who 
share similar properties. To treat people fairly is not to treat all of them equally, but to 
introduce some distinction based on risk exposure. 
Finally, the claim is widespread in the industry that the unfairness of non-actuarial 
premiums may be self-reinforcing through their incentive effect. As the argument usually 
goes, if premiums do not closely mirror policyholders’ risk profiles, agents whose premiums 
are underestimated will have an incentive to adopt riskier behaviour, i.e. to personally benefit 
from the insurance beyond what they should. Since the actuarial costs of their risks are 
underestimated, it is rational for them to increase their risk exposure. They then adopt 
opportunistic behaviour and free ride on social cooperation. 
Non-actuarial premiums would be conducive to moral hazard17, which seems unfair 
since some policyholders, in addition to contributing to the mutual risk coverage, pay for 
losses attached to actions that other policyholders have decided to undertake and, worse, 
which they have decided to undertake on a larger scale due to non-actuarial premiums. They 
subsidize other policyholders for worsening the situation of everyone else and extracting a 
benefit from the insurance. In that case, unfairness is located in the consequences of unfair 
premiums (in the absence of posterior adjustments of the premiums). Premiums that do not 
reflect risk profiles amplify the original unfairness.18 
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The background of the argument about the unfairness of expected utility alteration is 
the implicit reference to one’s desert or merit (getting one’s proper share) and the role that 
one plays in controlling one’s risks (moral hazard). Low risks do not deserve to assume the 
costs of high risks, especially when the latter undertake riskier activities because their 
premiums are not actuarially sound. The implicit notion of risk property (“each policyholder 
should assume his own risk”) and the opportunistic dynamics highlight the importance of 
individual responsibility, which is blatant in current debates on insurance, whether public or 
private. Before considering the notion of risk property, a few words are necessary on the 
actual role of individual responsibility in the concept of actuarial fairness. 
 
2.c Individual responsibility 
If we try to formulate the role played by the notion of individual responsibility in actuarial 
fairness, we might say that individuals should pay for the losses they are responsible for (i.e. 
their expected losses and their expected losses only).19 Risks that are choice-dependent should 
be either underwritten more tightly (i.e. policyholders should pay higher premiums that reflect 
their degree of control) or, more simply, de-pooled (i.e. such risks should not be insurable in 
virtue of their dependence on policyholders’ choices). Reversely, individuals should not pay 
for the losses they are not responsible for, i.e. for risks generated by other policyholders. 
Ronald Dworkin expresses a comparable idea with his analysis of expensive tastes (Dworkin 
2002) and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary expensive tastes. 
Imagine that a connoisseur of champagne cannot be satisfied with less expensive 
drinks like water, beer or regular wine. Should this connoisseur get compensated for his 
tastes? Dworkin’s argument is usually thought to be a critique of welfarism, since if what 
matters for the distribution of resources is achievement in terms of welfare, the connoisseur of 
champagne should be given priority because the nature of his preferences requires him to use 
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more resources to reach an equivalent subjective welfare than someone else. From Dworkin’s 
perspective, the conclusion of the discussion of expensive tastes is that welfarism is not a 
terribly attractive moral position since it may lead to subsidizing individual preferences that 
are constitutive of life choices (i.e. voluntary expensive tastes). As it appears morally dubious 
to support the connoisseur of champagne for his costly habits, if he has chosen such habits, it 
appears morally dubious to support individuals for their risky behaviour, especially if it is the 
result of their choice. 
In the same vein, unfair premiums force some policyholders to financially support 
other policyholders for the harmful or expensive consequences of their behaviour. As a means 
of illustration, young female drivers have traditionally paid lower premiums for motor 
insurance than young male drivers. The explanation is that they are less prone to have a car 
accident than male drivers in their first years of driving due to higher risk aversion that 
translates into safer driving habits, low consumption of alcohol and narcotics, and so forth. 
However, the European Court of Justice ruled in March 2011 that using gender as a 
risk factor will constitute discrimination after December 21st 2012.20 The insurance industry 
immediately denounced the ‘unfairness’ of the decision. The British Insurance Brokers’ 
Association (BIBA) used car insurance to object to the decision: ‘females will now pay a 
cross-subsidy for males on their insurance premiums’.21 In addition to representing a 
subsidization of male drivers’ choices, unfair premiums will give rise to opportunistic 
behaviours. Powerful vehicles will become more affordable to young male drivers, leading to 
an increased probability of accidents. And, last but not least, since insurance will be cheaper, 
young male drivers will become less risk averse. 
This reaction from automobile insurers to the ruling of the European Court of Justice 
seem to be grounded on the idea that premiums are fair insofar as they only correlate to risks 
that fall under policyholders’ responsibility. Therefore, the insurers’ reaction gives the 
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impression that it is unfair for policyholders to pay for risks that are unrelated to their 
responsibility. This fairness/unfairness cut based on individual responsibility can be justified 
by two arguments. Firstly, cross-subsidization would be unfair when it comes to risks that are 
choice-sensitive. Since car accidents heavily depend on one’s driving habits, making other 
people pay for the careless behaviour of some is morally problematic. Secondly, such cross-
subsidization would create moral hazard. In short, risks sensitive to choices rise if premiums 
are under-evaluated. As a result, additional losses would be pooled (since original premiums 
are actuarially unsound, it makes sense to presume that they will remain so), which implies 
that all policyholders will pay for the extra losses incurred by some of them. 
This argument is not limited to gender discrimination for car insurance; health sector 
furnishes other examples. There have been numerous debates, in private and public sectors, 
about the unfairness of holding all policyholders responsible for health costs related to 
lifestyle diseases (or pathologies identified as such) like smoking-related cancers, obesity or, 
sometimes, AIDS (Daniels 1990). But the question arises: is the unfairness of non-actuarial 
premiums really located in the cross-subsidization of choice-sensitive risks such as motor 
vehicle accidents? 
Under close scrutiny, the argument that tries to ground actuarial fairness on individual 
responsibility (in the sense that fairness would require policyholders to pay only for the costs 
that stem from risks they are responsible for) is inconsistent. In order to realize that, one 
should consider a case comparable to motor insurance, but where actuarial fairness justifies a 
completely different outcome: pensions.22 
In the 1970s, the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles was 
charging differentiated premiums for its pension fund based on mortality tables. Since life 
expectancy is several years longer for females than for males, and pensions are an insurance 
against the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings, women were charged higher premiums 
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than men according to a reasoning identical to that used for car insurance, but with opposite 
results for women. A class action initiated by the female employees of the Department of 
Water and Power led the US Supreme Court to judge that the disposition infringed the 1964 
Civil Rights Act (Title VII) ‘which, inter alia, makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against any individual because of such individual's sex’.23 
The case is interesting for three reasons. First of all, gender plays an opposite role than 
in motor insurance, which generates opposite, negative, intuitions about actuarial fairness. 
Then, the case shows that actuarial fairness can (and often does) clash with other intuitions 
one may hold about fairness (women, who are also vulnerable on labour markets, are imposed 
higher premiums for their pensions). Finally, it demonstrates that actuarial fairness obliges 
policyholders to assume costs for risks they are mostly not responsible for (life expectancy, 
i.e. the risk of outliving one’s savings). 
In the case of pensions, women are charged higher premiums because they live longer, 
on average, than men. Imposing flat rates in this case equates to making men finance 
women’s longer retirement. It might seem unfair from the expected utility point of view, but 
the fairness/unfairness has nothing to do with individual responsibility since insurers have 
been traditionally eager to impose higher premiums for risks out of one’s control (e.g. pre-
existing health conditions, genetics, etc.). 
What is the exact importance of individual responsibility for actuarial fairness then? 
Actually, individual responsibility constitutes an independent consideration that is linked to 
moral hazard, i.e. to the ex post variance of probabilities and amplitude of losses. There is 
moral hazard because insurance is offered for risks over which individuals have some control 
and from which they might benefit. Nevertheless, moral hazard as a collective action problem 
has nothing to do with the fact that premiums are actuarially unsound, even if non-actuarial 
premiums may accentuate the alteration of individual expected utilities and so accentuate the 
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incentive to benefit from insurance. Furthermore, if premiums are re-calculated after the 
emergence of moral hazard, there is no fairness issue anymore. Finally, moral hazard happens 
even in the presence of actuarially fair premiums (for example, all drivers drive faster with 
than without car insurance, no matter if their premiums closely reflect their risk profiles), 
which proves that it cannot be an argument in favour of actuarial fairness. 
 
3. Actuarial Fairness: Three Objections 
When considering why and how actuarial fairness could be fair, some arguments are more 
convincing than others. For instance, strict cost shifting and individual responsibility do not 
offer a strong basis for justifying for why strict actuarial premiums are fair. A better job is 
done by arguments centred on the idea that the alteration of the expected utility is unfair and, 
as a consequence, actuarial premiums (i.e. premiums that reflect risk exposure) guarantee 
fairness among policyholders. However, the fairness of actuarial premiums depends on 
second-order reasons, including the respect for the terms of the insurance contract and the 
status of the policyholders as participants in a cooperative mechanism who freely decide to 
abide by mutually and equally restrictive rules and principles. These reasons (among others) 
are salient for judging how fair actuarial fairness is. 
Yet, the identification of actuarial fairness as based, at the first level, on the non-
alteration of individuals’ expected utility and, at the second level, on some kind of prior 
agreement about the nature of the cooperative mechanism leaves some issues untouched. 
Three in particular deserve to be mentioned since they bear on the application of actuarial 
fairness to the domain of public insurance. 
 
3.a Individuals should pay for their own risks, and only their own risks. 
Insert 
Table 2 
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The first question is about a notion that could be formulated as risk property. There are two 
understandings of what “one’s own risks” could mean. According to a broad interpretation, 
“one’s own risks” encompass all risks that happen to a specific policyholder. Any loss 
experienced by a given policyholder is, as a matter of fact, his, as is the risk (i.e. the anterior 
exposure to loss, without the obligation for such risk to occur) that underlies such loss. 
Therefore, the negative consequences should be underwritten in his insurance policy. 
According to a narrow interpretation, one’s own risks encompass all risks that are, in some 
extent, related to one’s actions, lifestyle, and so forth. 
Some practices in the insurance industry seem to confirm the narrow interpretation. 
Car insurance covers risks that are related to driver habits and behaviours. Fire insurance 
compensates for risks that emerge following some misbehaviour or lack of care (regarding 
electric appliances or furnaces). Insurance against home robbery covers for risks that are 
usually avoidable by proper care (additional locks on doors, camera surveillance system, 
watch dogs, alarm, etc.). 
However, the narrow interpretation is too restrictive. Many risks are actually 
independent from individual behaviour. In the case of health insurance, the industry charges 
individuals for their risk exposure, which is determined by individuals’ lifestyles and other 
factors such as age, gender, location, family and personal antecedents, and so forth, so by 
factors that cannot be strictly connected with individual responsibility. 
Another example is unemployment benefits. Unemployment may result from one’s 
misbehaviour at the workplace or one’s unwillingness to get a job, but, in our societies, it 
remains largely the consequence of the economic situation, so structural factors (such as the 
level of the aggregate demand and its repartition across the different sectors). Current high 
levels of unemployment are directly imputable, for the most part, to the economic downturn 
that followed the 2008 crisis. For an individual, being unemployed is his risk because it 
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happens to him, but it is difficult to argue that it is his risk because it is directly and 
significantly produced by his choices or actions. More, it might be argued that the agents 
responsible for the current economic difficulties are some mortgage brokers, bankers, 
insurers, and regulators, but not most of the jobless people. 
In that context, the expression of one’s own risks mostly refers to the broad view 
where everything that might happen to an agent turns out to be his own risk. It is, however, 
one thing to locate a risk and another to attribute some material or moral responsibility for it. 
There are two questions here, the first about the attribution of risks to individuals, the second 
about the attribution of material responsibility for such risks. Actuarial fairness as commonly 
invoked by the industry tends to conflate these two dimensions considering that material 
responsibility directly derives from risk ascription. 
So, to which extent and under which conditions are individuals materially responsible 
for what happens to them? Replying to this question is essential for judging the fairness of a 
given structure of premiums. So far, the rule of the attribution of the material responsibility of 
losses is incomplete in the mobilization of actuarial fairness in the industry. There is a missing 
link. As a last example: you are insured against fire, and your neighbour throws an incendiary 
bomb in your house. The resulting fire is your risk because it happens to you, but should the 
probability of receiving an incendiary bomb in one’s house be accounted for in one’s 
premiums? Imagine that your insurance forces you to have coverage for every kind of damage 
that might happen to me whatever the origin. Are the resulting premiums fair? The kind of 
reply one may provide to this question is contingent on a more or less explicit rule of risk 
ascription. But such discussion exceeds the scope of this article. 
 
3.b When entering into a pooling device such as insurance, individuals expect to 
contribute only at the level of their own risks. If they don’t, premiums are unfair. 
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This statement expresses the view that situates the foundation of actuarial fairness in the 
original terms of social cooperation. However, what is the epistemological status of this 
statement? Do people actually expect to contribute only at the level of their own risks? Or 
should they be expected to expect to contribute only at the level of their own risks? Is it an 
empirical or a hypothetical claim? Indirectly, what is at stake here is the pretention of 
insurance to be rooted in a scientific approach, namely actuarial sciences.24 
There are two ways – empirical and hypothetical – to understand this claim. The 
empirical view affirms that individuals do actually expect to contribute at the strict level of 
their risk exposure. It is a matter of fact and, as such, it is the basis of insurance, because 
having premiums that diverge from the expected losses constitutes either a deception or a 
breach of an initial (implicit) agreement. But, understood as such, the claim raises the 
question of the capacity of individuals to properly evaluate their risk exposure. If they 
experience difficulties carrying on such evaluation, they will not know the exact terms of the 
contract they agreed to. They will know how much they put in the insurance without knowing 
(and, so, being able to evaluate) how much this contribution actually reflects their risk 
exposure. More than their ability to commit themselves, it would undermine the moral value 
of their commitment. To determine if an actuarial calculation is fair, it would be necessary to 
ask each individual about his understanding of the terms of the insurance and compare the 
responses to the genuine terms of particular insurance contracts. 
Another manner of understanding the claim is the hypothetical view. It stipulates that 
what individuals actually think or believe regarding the terms of the contract does not matter 
so much. When the premiums are based on accurate probabilities, they are fair anyway 
because individuals need to pay for their objective expected losses. In this case, people are 
expected to expect to contribute only at the level of their risk exposure. Such a comprehension 
raises three questions. 
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Firstly, can the objective probabilities be incorporated in actuarial calculations? Which 
degree of objectivity is needed to turn premiums into fair ones? Not speaking about fairness 
for the moment, but about the very possibility of basing premiums on objective probabilities, 
consider the actuarial calculation for financial risks. In 2007, systemic risks (caused by the 
degree of interdependence between mortgage lenders, banks, insurers, re-insurers and 
corporations) as well as unpredictable risks (the famous “Black Swans” (Taleb 2008), i.e. 
risks with such low probabilities that they are not included in the risk assessment) were 
underestimated. This epistemological limitation had concrete and severe negative outcomes. 
For instance, insurance companies were far more exposed to risks than they thought they were 
because derivatives’ markets were perceived to be much more stable than they were, etc. The 
crisis illustrates the uncertainty that remains in any probabilistic account and, consequently, in 
any insurance system. Concretely, it implies that individuals always pay, partly, for 
something that diverges in some respect from their objective, real, risk exposure because 
objective risk is inaccessible. 
Secondly, how should class rating, a practice which is at the core of the industry, be 
regarded? Since the level of risk of a given individual cannot be exactly evaluated (everything 
is statistical, so calculated according to the Law of the Large Numbers), each individual pays 
for the risk exposure that characterizes the class to which he belongs according to his 
demographic and personal characteristics. As a consequence, he still pays for others’ risks or 
receives a surplus from the contribution of other policyholders. So, the principle that 
premiums are fair as long as they strictly reflect one’s expected losses should not be 
interpreted too strictly. Premiums cannot precisely reflect one’s level of risk. Consequently, 
even hypothetically, individuals cannot be expected to expect to contribute at the level of their 
own risks. 
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Thirdly, how to interpret the common practice among insurance companies to adjust 
premiums based on the kind of coverage selected by policyholders? By doing so, insurers do 
not track down so much one’s “objective” level of risk (contrary to what is assumed by the 
theory of revealed preferences), but, rather, one’s risk aversion, which is different. The 
dimension that is skimmed off in many discussions is that premiums not only reflect one’s 
risk exposure, but also one’s tolerance vis-à-vis uncertainty (no matter one’s risk profile). 
Thus, the view that stipulates that premiums are fair due to a hypothetical initial 
agreement should include this dimension. The implication is that there is not just one fair 
(ideal) solution when it comes to the calculation of premiums – the expected losses – but a 
variety of solutions with different levels of coverage that mirror different levels of risk 
aversion. It means that by looking at one’s level of risk, an insurer cannot determine if the 
premiums that would be derived from it will be judged as being fair. Moreover, it stresses the 
idea that individuals cannot be, even hypothetically, expected to contribute at the level of their 
risk exposure only. Ultimately, it stresses an important dimension of insurance, partly 
disregarded by the industry: although the social benefit of insurance is to spread risks, it is 
also to curb the subjective feeling of uncertainty. 
This awareness of the importance of risk aversion to the kind of arrangement 
individuals judge worthwhile raises a last question. Is it fair to make premiums dependent on 
one’s risk exposure and risk aversion? A way to reformulate the question is to determine 
whether risk aversion represents a voluntary or involuntary expensive taste in the Dworkinian 
sense. The question is complex because it is not only about one’s subjective tolerance of 
uncertainty, but also one’s material capacity to handle potential losses. Individuals may 
subscribe to extra insurance for the very reason that they know that they will not be able to 
cope with the potential losses due to limited resources, where it may not be a problem for 
advantaged individuals (who do not subscribe to any extra insurance because they can handle 
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the potential losses). In this case, do risk-averse policyholders still pay for their own risk or 
for something else too? Which is then the right level of additional premiums to levy on risk-
averse individuals in order to keep premiums fair? Why is it fair to make someone pay for his 
risk aversion? 
 
3.c The fairness of the principle of expected utility invariance. 
The version of actuarial fairness discussed in these pages postulates that an increase in 
expected utility for some policyholders translates into an equivalent decrease in expected 
utility for other policyholders. Every gain or loss should be compensated within the system. It 
is a zero-sum game: the net benefit of some should be paid out of the pockets of others. The 
implicit assumption is that insurance is a non-productive cooperative arrangement, in 
comparison, for instance, to economies of scale that imply gains of productivity (Heath 
2006a).25 Insurance would not add anything to or retrench anything from the world. It 
explains why the concept of actuarial fairness cannot tolerate net transfers, in the long run, 
among policyholders. Since the system is closed and no extra resource is generated, 
individuals take out of the insurance what they previously put in. Furthermore, to be 
completely fair, such an arrangement should lead individuals to take out what they put in (i.e. 
to have a level of coverage aligned with their contribution, which means their expected 
losses). 
This formulation is far too restrictive. Even if we grant that insurance is not a 
productive arrangement per se in the sense that it does not directly produce any added value, 
it is nevertheless a cooperative arrangement that indirectly generates social benefits of various 
sorts. For instance, health insurance may increase labour mobility, which leads to a better 
allocation of the labour force throughout a given territory.26 Insurance creates additional 
resources. For instance, the fact that work accidents were covered by insurance promoted 
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industrialization (Ewald 1986). Insurance incentivized entrepreneurs to invest in their 
factories, even if it led to more accidents. 
Because insurance offers to some individuals the opportunity not to support the full 
costs of their actions, they undertake riskier but socially beneficial activities (e.g. trading 
overseas, starting businesses, becoming highly specialized). In other words, insurance 
removes, or at least reduces, a great deal of the uncertainty individuals face in their personal 
and professional lives, which renders courses of action that produce (collective) benefits that 
are usually overshadowed by (private) costs more attractive. Insurance transforms uncertainty 
into statistical risk that could be spread over the community, which is accompanied by various 
social benefits (Anonymized reference). 
In this context where insurance as a cooperative mechanism produces gains for the 
participants themselves in terms of risk management, but also for the whole society in terms 
of increased wealth, industrial initiatives, scientific advances and so forth, the concept of 
actuarial fairness raises the political and philosophical problem of the distribution of the 
direct and indirect benefits incurred by insurance mechanisms.  
Insurance produces positive externalities that, as externalities, are not accounted for 
when premiums are strictly calculated on the expected losses a given agent faces.27 Imagine 
that an agent’s activities generate large social gains for which she is not fully retributed (e.g. 
Marie Curie). Furthermore, these activities may bear important potential losses for the agent 
(e.g. in terms of health costs for Marie Curie). In the absence of other sources of motivation, 
agents may have no reason to engage in socially beneficial, but individually hazardous, 
activities. 
Insurance may either reinforce or alter this structure of incentives. In the case of strict 
actuarial premiums, the agent pays premiums that reflect her personal risk exposure, the share 
of the pooled resources she may need to use to cover her losses, but these premiums do not 
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reflect the additional wealth, knowledge or collective benefits such an individual creates (e.g. 
Marie Curie’s research on polonium and radium) for the enjoyment of other individuals. The 
heart of the matter is that by imposing premiums that strictly reflect one’s expected losses, 
actuarial fairness overburdens activities that produce benefits which are distant in time or 
space, i.e. benefits on which their producers have no direct claim. The premiums imposed on 
her might be actuarially fair, but could they be considered as fair everything considered, 
especially because her activities improve the common lot, i.e. the resources others enjoy? 
In addition to the unfairness of the situation (the agent is not recompensed for her 
socially beneficial activities), there is a more perverse and damaging effect. Since the 
producer of the externalities cannot enjoy the full benefits generated by her activities while 
having to cover the full expected losses, individual incentives are distorted. At the extreme, 
our agent may be forced to cease her activities due to too high premiums that she could not 
assume without collective subsidization of one form or another (for instance, non-actuarial, 
i.e. reduced, premiums).28 
To summarize this third section, actuarial fairness is an incomplete conception under 
its own standards because it cannot account for objective risks. It is also a flexible conception 
in the sense that individuals do not pay for their strict risk exposure, while being subjective 
since the amount of premiums that may be considered as fair depends on individual risk 
aversion. Finally, it is a narrow conception that does not include the positive externalities 
generated by risky activities. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In the end, the discussion about actuarial fairness is a discussion of the criteria for 
determining whether a cooperative arrangement is fair or not, but also a discussion of the right 
(moral) perspective from where to judge such an arrangement. The previous pages have 
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described a tension between two visions of fairness in different social settings, which is the 
subject of numerous debates in public policy. 
On the one hand, the actuarial conception of fairness is based on considerations 
internal to insurance mechanisms (how to handle risks through a pooling device). Put 
differently, the only defensible normative position for evaluating a cooperative mechanism 
(e.g. insurance, trade, production) is to judge the social benefits of such a mechanism when 
operating under strict internal considerations (i.e. when insurance only aims at managing risks 
and nothing else) and how the gains and burdens are distributed within the mechanism itself. 
Considering that insurance is about pooling risks for increasing the statistical reliance (and 
allowing the calculation of probabilities and spreading of losses), it seems fair not to go 
astray of a strict pooling mechanism and distribution of costs according to expected losses 
(i.e. to turn this device into something else). 
On the other hand, objections to actuarial fairness usually adopt a broader scope for 
determining whether an arrangement (i.e. a distribution of the gains and costs) is fair or not. 
Whereas the actuarial view tends to reduce fairness to the respect by the agents for their duties 
qua participants to the cooperative mechanism (insurance), the broader version presents a 
more demanding conception of fairness (like when Norman Daniels attributes to health 
insurance the task of preserving or guaranteeing the ‘fair equality of opportunity’ [Daniels 
1990, p. 512]). Cooperative terms are fair if they respect principles and terms that are mainly 
external to the cooperative mechanism. Considering the importance of insurance in people’s 
lives, it seems important to include considerations for the personal situation or the social 
environment when determining if a specific arrangement is fair. Consistent with this position 
is the view that the distant social benefits of insurance (the positive externalities) should be 
included in one’s judgment about the fairness of a structure of premiums. 
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This tension sheds light on the issue of the proper normative constraints to be imposed 
on specific cooperative devices. For instance, one may consider that insurance should abide 
by its own rules, i.e. by actuarial principles, for guaranteeing its efficiency (i.e. avoiding 
moral hazard or adverse selection). Furthermore, it may be argued that what is expected from 
any insurance is to cover adequately people against risks and, for that, it requires actuarial 
calculations and maybe charging people according to their own risk profile (expected losses) 
and only their own risk profile. In other words, the social value of insurance would stem from 
its efficiency at reducing uncertainty and spreading risks. As such, it would make the case for 
scrupulously respecting actuarial fairness in order not to disrupt the production of social 
benefits. 
The issue of the fair terms of social cooperation runs through these pages: should 
insurance, as a particular cooperative arrangement, abide by its own rules or should it be 
subjected to more general rules of fairness? Actuarial fairness poses the question of the 
repartition of the costs and benefits of cooperation, not in general, but of a specific kind (risk 
pooling). It emphasizes the necessity to consider thoroughly three sub-questions during future 
research on insurance: (1) What is the original agreement to which individuals may 
reasonably be supposed to have adhered as policyholders? (2) How should individual 
responsibility mitigate each policyholder’s contribution? (3) How should external benefits be 
allocated (to the cooperative mechanism)? Should they be left outside of the specific 
cooperative mechanism or internalized? In short, actuarial fairness raises the essential 
question of the conditions that define fair or just social cooperation. 
 
                                                
1 Any discussion of insurance should distinguish between insurance as the general cooperative 
arrangement among individuals based on risk pooling and specific arrangements where an 
insurer acts as an intermediary between policyholders. In other words, a distinction should be 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                   
made between the concept and different conceptions of insurance. This article is mainly about 
the concept of insurance as a cooperative mechanism. Even if mentions are made of cases 
where an insurer acts as an intermediary, the locus of the article remains the philosophy of 
insurance, i.e. the normative principles that should prevail when individuals decide to pool 
their risks in the face of uncertainty. We are grateful to an anonymous referee who brought 
this point to our attention. 
2 Actuarial fairness as a topic of philosophical and normative enquiry is relatively under-
developed, especially compared to fairness in redistributive justice, for instance. No matter 
how emerging, the ground-breaking works of various authors should be acknowledged here, 
in particular for their contribution to the analysis of insurance, underwriting and actuarial 
fairness (e.g. Baker 1996, 2000; Baker and Simon 2002; Daniels 1990; Heath 2007; Lethonen 
and Liukko 2011; Radetzki et al. 2008; Stone 1999-2000). 
3 This echoes Joseph Heath’s discussion of the scope of political justice (Heath 2006b). 
4 Underwriting is the “process of examining, accepting, or rejecting insurance risks, and 
classifying those selected, in order to charge the proper premium for each. The purpose of 
underwriting is to spread the risk among a pool of insureds in a manner that is equitable for 
the insureds and profitable for the insurer” (Rubin 2008, p. 536) (for a detailed discussion 
refer to (Anonymized reference)). 
5 “The expected value of an act is the sum of the products of such an act (utilities × 
probabilities)” (Hacking 2001, p. 80). 
6 This intuition supports positions that claim that insurance is not (or should not be) a 
redistributive device as expressed by Robert Goodin: “insurance is not fundamentally 
redistributive at all” (Goodin 1988, p. 159). It can also be found in other works (e.g. Moss 
2002, p. 19). 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                   
7 An externality – or external effect – is a cost (negative externality) or a gain (positive 
externality) that is suffered (enjoyed) by a third party to an original exchange. This initial and 
voluntary exchange between two individuals generates an effect that is ‘external’ in the sense 
that it is not part of the contract that the third party has not agreed to and that it is not 
accounted for in the pricing system. In this respect, externalities are cases of market failures 
(Papandreou 1994). 
8 A credit default swap is “a credit derivative structured as a swap. One party is a lender 
facing a credit risk from a third party and the counterparty in the swap agrees to insure this 
risk in exchange for regular periodic payments (essentially an insurance premium). If the third 
party defaults the counterparty insurer will have to purchase from the insured defaulted asset. 
In turn, the insurer pays the insured the remaining interest on the debt as well as the principal” 
(Bennett 2004, p. 84). 
9 Risk-shifting (or risk-trading) and risk-pooling mechanisms are two different forms of risk 
management (Heath 2006a, pp. 323-324; Moss 2002, pp. 92-94). Risk-shifting arrangements, 
exemplified by CDS, consist in the transfer of risk from one agent to another, while in risk-
pooling devices (such as insurance), there is no transfer of the risk or its charge. In the latter, 
policyholders collectively face risks and their material consequences. Risk-shifting 
mechanisms extract their efficiency by trading risks from risk-adverse agents or agents who 
have few resources for facing risks to less risk-adverse or more affluent agents. Risk-pooling 
mechanisms extract their efficiency from the Law of Large Numbers (cf. infra note 14), i.e. 
the increased statistical reliability implied by the pooling of risk profiles and resources. 
10 For a transfer of costs to be completely fair, some conditions should be met regarding the 
bargaining conditions that led to the agreement. For instance, A should not be pressured by B 
to accept the deal. In addition, there are two issues here: one of consent, which is the most 
important, and another of compensation since some situations where a person suffers some 
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additional costs might be fair everything considered because she is compensated despite not 
having agreed to it. It might be argued that, under certain circumstances, such an arrangement 
is fair. But, it is not discussed here. 
11 Such a confusion can be found in Kenneth Arrow (Arrow 1963, p. 945) or in Barron’s 
Dictionary of Insurance Terms. Under the entry “insurance”, one can find the following 
definition: “mechanism for contractually shifting burdens of a number of pure risks by 
pooling them” (Rubin 2008, p. 246, emphasis added). 
12 Expected utility may be objective or subjective, depending on if it includes pure facts or 
one’s conviction. Some prefer the distinction between frequency and belief (Hacking 2001, 
pp. 127-139). In any case, according to the frequency-type (objective), probabilities are 
testable, impersonal and based on tendency, propensity and disposition. According to the 
belief-type, probabilities express a personal or interpersonal view based on confidence and 
evidence. Except when mentioning that probabilities should be understood from the 
individual perspective, we use expected utility in an objective fashion, following the 
frequency-type probabilities. 
13 In other words, if insurance may be seen as redistributive at a given moment in time, it is 
not redistributive in terms of expected utility. 
14 The Law of Large Numbers is the “mathematical premise stating that the greater the 
number of exposures, (1) the more accurate the prediction; (2) the less the deviation of the 
actual losses from the expected losses (X – x approaches zero); and (3) greater the credibility 
of the prediction (credibility approaches 1). This law forms the basis for the statistical 
expectation of loss upon which premium rates for insurance policies are calculated” (Rubin 
2008, pp. 272-273). In other words, “[a]s the number of trials increases, the accuracy 
probability approaches 1”. Then, “[r]elative frequencies tend to converge on probabilities” 
(Hacking 2001, p. 197). 
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15 We are grateful to Søren Midtgaard for bringing this point to our attention. 
16 Community rating takes place when no differentiation is made among contributors in regard 
to their risk exposure. 
17 Moral hazard characterizes a “circumstance which increases the probability of loss because 
of an applicant’s personal habits or morals; for example, if an applicant is a known criminal” 
(Rubin 2008, p. 322). 
18 As evoked below, this objection holds only insofar as risks are choice sensitive. Moreover, 
moral hazard takes place no matter if premiums are actuarially fair or not. It illustrates the fact 
that moral hazard is an argument against insurance in general, not against non-actuarial 
premiums in particular. 
19 The view discussed here introduces individual responsibility in the calculation of the 
adequate premiums in the sense that fair premiums should reflect one’s level of responsibility 
in regard to the risks covered. It is, however, not the only use of the concept of responsibility. 
For instance, one may claim that rather than adjusting one’s premiums, individual 
responsibility should be used for drawing a line between insurable (responsibility-insensitive) 
risks and uninsurable (responsibility-sensitive) ones. 
20 Case C-236/09, Association des Consommateurs Belges Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. 
Conseil des Ministres (2011). 
21 ‘ECJ gender ruling hits insurance costs’, The Guardian, March 1st 2011. 
22 For a detailed discussion, refer to Joseph Heath (Heath 2007). 
23 City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702 (1978). 
24 This touches upon the broader issue of the quality of the scientific standards used by risk 
management. 
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25 Economies of scale happen when adding more workers increases the global productivity of 
the unit of production (e.g. the factory) in a larger proportion than the sum of their individual 
productivities.  
26 The question of the connection between health insurance and labour mobility revolves 
around the question of the portability of the rights to health insurance (e.g. Bailey and 
Chorniy 2013; Holtz-Eakin 1993; Madrian 2004). We are grateful to one anonymous referee 
for indicating such a connection to us. 
27 A’s activities may enhance the situation of other agents, which is a Pareto improvement. 
However, it might be the case that, due to strict actuarial premiums, by undertaking his 
activity, and while improving the situation of everyone else, A is actually worsening his own 
situation. This advocates for accounting for spillover and external effects in any normative 
evaluation of insurance and the fairness of its conditions. 
28 One may argue that actuarial premiums are not the problem here, but the fact that a given 
activity has a spillover effect from which the producer of the activity does not benefit. The 
distinction would be blatant in the obvious solution of re-internalizing the externalities by 
transferring additional resources collected by the distant beneficiaries of the positive 
externalities to their producer. So, premiums could remain determined on a strict actuarial 
basis whereas beneficial activities could be properly incentivized. However, this kind of 
measure precisely shows that actuarial premiums are incomplete in the sense that they need to 
be corrected (or complemented) to be fully fair and efficient. In other terms, actuarial fairness 
does not encapsulate the complete story of the fairness and efficiency of insurance as a 
mechanism of social cooperation. 
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Table 1. Actuarial Fairness. Justifications. 
1. Cost shifting 2. Alteration of the expected utility 
 
1.a. Radical version: All instances of cost 
shifting are unfair 
 
Objection: The definition is too demanding 
and exclusory  
 
1.b. Moderate version: Only specific forms of 
cost shifting are unfair 
Shift of ex ante expected losses is problematic 
Unfairness lies in the alteration of the 
expected utility of policyholders (which leads 
to 2.) 
2.a. Deception 
2.b. Breach of the explicit or 
implicit contract between 
co-operators 
2.c. Individual responsibility 
 
Non-actuarial premiums are 
unfair because they are 
deceptive 
 
Objection: Deception and 
fairness are independent 
considerations 
 
Fairness of outcomes: Non-
actuarial premiums cannot be 
 
Non-actuarial premiums are 
unfair because they violate 
policyholders’ expectations of 
invariance of the expected 
utility 
 
Additional claim: Non-
actuarial premiums accentuate 
unfairness by promoting 
moral hazard 
 
Non-actuarial premiums are 
unfair because individuals 
should pay for the losses they 
are responsible for 
 
Objection: Responsibility is 
not a criterion that determines 
the access to or conditions of 
insurance coverage 
 
unfair in this sense 
 
Procedural fairness: Non-
actuarial premiums might be 
unfair in regard to the original 
terms of cooperation (which 
leads to 2.b.) 
Conclusion: Moral hazard 
under the form of ex post 
variance of probabilities and 
amplitude of losses is an 
independent consideration  
 
 
Table 2. Actuarial Fairness. Objections. 
3.a. Individuals should pay for their own 
risks and only their own risks 
3.b. When entering into a pooling device 
such as insurance, individuals expect to 
contribute only at the level of their own 
risks. If they don’t, premiums are unfair 
3.c. The fairness of the principle of expected 
utility invariance 
 
Two formulations of risk property 
 
1. Narrow version: One’s risks are all risks 
for which a policyholder is causally 
responsible 
 
Objection: The narrow version is too narrow 
since insurance plans cover all kinds of risk 
independent of one’s responsibility 
 
Two views on individual expectations 
 
1. Empirical view: Individuals do actually 
expect to contribute at the strict level of their 
risk exposure 
 
Objection: Individuals display a lack of 
ability to actually evaluate such exposure 
 
 
The principle of expected utility invariance 
presents a zero-sum game vision of insurance 
as a cooperative mechanism 
The underlying assumption is that insurance is 
a non-productive mechanism 
 
Objection: Insurance produces various 
positive externalities that could spill over the 
whole society, such as increased wealth, 
Risk property is independent of material 
responsibility 
 
2. Broad version: One’s risks are all risks 
that a given policyholder experiences 
 
Objection: Risk property does not imply 
material responsibility 
 
The question of the fairness of the ensuing 
premiums arises 
2. Hypothetical view: Individuals are 
expected to expect to contribute at the strict 
level of their risk exposure 
 
Three problems: 
a. Pure objective risks are inaccessible 
b. Class rating introduces a deviation of the 
premiums from individuals’ risk profiles 
c. Risk aversion introduces a deviation of the 
premiums from objective risk exposure 
innovations, labour mobility, and so forth 
 
